5-9-19 In matters of overseas Chinese policy, the March 2018 announcement effectively subordinated the state Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Party’s UFWD. This gives the UFWD greater control over attachés and consuls responsible for overseas Chinese work at China’s diplomatic missions, more of whom will now be drawn from the UFWD. https://jamestown.org/program/reorganizing-the-united-front-work-department-new-structures-for-a-new-era-of-diaspora-and-religious-affairs-work/
...............
personnel often operate under diplomatic cover as
members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,16 using this role to guide united front
activities outside China, working with politicians and other high profile individuals,
Chinese community associations, and student associations, and sponsoring Chinese
language, media, and cultural activities. The Party has a long tradition of party and
government personnel “double-hatting”; holding roles within multiple agencies. 17
Chinese consulates and embassies relay instructions to Chinese community groups
and the Chinese language media and they host visits of high-level CCP delegations
coming to meet with local overseas Chinese groups. The leaders of the various
China-connected overseas Chinese associations in each country are regularly invited
to China to update them on current government policies.
The CCP wants to avoid being seen to “lead” [领导] the overseas Chinese community, but rather prefers to be seen to “guide” [引导] them.18 Overseas Chinese leaders who cooperate in this guidance are encouraged to see their participation as a form of service, serving the Chinese Motherland, the Chinese race, and the ethnic Chinese population within the countries where they live. Their cooperation with China is meant to be a “win-win” situation, whereby they and their community will achieve gains at the same time as China achieving its own agenda.19 The goal of successful overseas Chinese work is to get the community to proactively and even better, spontaneously, engage in activities which enhance China’s foreign policy agenda.
After more than 30 years of this work, there are few overseas Chinese associations able to completely evade “guidance”—other than those affiliated with the religious group Falungong, Taiwan independence, pro-independence Tibetans and Uighurs, independent Chinese religious groups outside party-state controlled religions, and the democracy movement—and even these are subject to being infiltrated by informers and a target for united front work.20
The CCP wants to avoid being seen to “lead” [领导] the overseas Chinese community, but rather prefers to be seen to “guide” [引导] them.18 Overseas Chinese leaders who cooperate in this guidance are encouraged to see their participation as a form of service, serving the Chinese Motherland, the Chinese race, and the ethnic Chinese population within the countries where they live. Their cooperation with China is meant to be a “win-win” situation, whereby they and their community will achieve gains at the same time as China achieving its own agenda.19 The goal of successful overseas Chinese work is to get the community to proactively and even better, spontaneously, engage in activities which enhance China’s foreign policy agenda.
After more than 30 years of this work, there are few overseas Chinese associations able to completely evade “guidance”—other than those affiliated with the religious group Falungong, Taiwan independence, pro-independence Tibetans and Uighurs, independent Chinese religious groups outside party-state controlled religions, and the democracy movement—and even these are subject to being infiltrated by informers and a target for united front work.20
As in the Cold War years, united front work not only serves foreign policy goals, but
can sometimes be used as a cover for intelligence activities.21 The Ministry of State
Security, Ministry of Public Security, PLA Joint Staff Headquarters’ Third
Department, Xinhua News Service, the United Front Work Department,
International Liaison Department, are the main, but not the only, PRC party-state
agencies who recruit foreign, especially ethnic Chinese, agents for the purpose of
collecting intelligence.22 In 2014, one former spy said that the Third Department had
at least 200,000 agents abroad.23 Some Chinese community associations act as fronts
for Chinese mafia who engage in illegal gambling; human trafficking; extortion; and
money laundering. As a leaked 1997 report by Canada’s RCMP-SIS noted, these
organizations also frequently have connections with China’s party-state intelligence
organizations.24
The crisis of 1989 resulted in the CCP government stepping up foreign persuasion efforts (外宣) aimed at the non-ethnic-Chinese public too. As they had done in the past, in this the Chinese government drew on the help of high level “friends of China”—foreign political figures such as the USA’s Henry Kissinger, to repair China's relations with the USA and other Western democracies. In1991 the State Council Information Office was set up to better promote China's policies to the outside world. Reflecting the fact that it is both a party and a state body, its other Chinese-only nameplate is the Office of Foreign Propaganda, 外宣办. Soon after, China Central Television (CCTV) launched its first English language channel. China gradually expanded its external influence activities under CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin (1989-2002). While these activities failed to ameliorate negative global public opinion towards the Chinese government and its policies, efforts to promote a positive image of China’s economic policies had much more success.25
In the era of CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (2002-2012) China made an even bigger investment to expand its foreign influence activities (大外宣). The aim was to get China's perspectives on global affairs heard and understood.26 CCTV set up a global, multi-platform network, CCTV International; while China Radio International (CRI), and Xinhua News Service also expanded their global presence. From 2007 the Hu government officially embraced Joseph Nye's theory of soft power, using it both as a justification and as a new euphemism, for the Chinese government's expanded and revised overseas Chinese and foreigner management techniques and propaganda offensive.27 ... Like Mao, Xi stresses the importance of information control. In the modernized information environment, this now means not only China’s public sphere, but also how the international media and international academia comments on China and China-related issues. Thus the revitalized CCTV International, re-branded in 2016 as CGTV (China Global Television), provides the CCP line to the outside world (emphasizing business, not politics) via 24-hour satellite broadcasts and social media. At the same time, China Radio International (CRI) and the Xinhua News Service have cornered niche foreign radio, television, and online platforms via mergers and partnership agreements. China Daily, the CCP’s English language newspaper, has arrangements to publish supplements in major newspapers around the world. China has also announced media cooperation partnerships with nations it calls “strategic partners” such as Russia, Turkey, and the 16-plus-1 (central and East European, plus China) states. Chinese universities and university presses have set up partnerships with their foreign counterparts and we are steadily seeing the creep of Chinese censorship into these domains as a result. ...
The crisis of 1989 resulted in the CCP government stepping up foreign persuasion efforts (外宣) aimed at the non-ethnic-Chinese public too. As they had done in the past, in this the Chinese government drew on the help of high level “friends of China”—foreign political figures such as the USA’s Henry Kissinger, to repair China's relations with the USA and other Western democracies. In1991 the State Council Information Office was set up to better promote China's policies to the outside world. Reflecting the fact that it is both a party and a state body, its other Chinese-only nameplate is the Office of Foreign Propaganda, 外宣办. Soon after, China Central Television (CCTV) launched its first English language channel. China gradually expanded its external influence activities under CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin (1989-2002). While these activities failed to ameliorate negative global public opinion towards the Chinese government and its policies, efforts to promote a positive image of China’s economic policies had much more success.25
In the era of CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (2002-2012) China made an even bigger investment to expand its foreign influence activities (大外宣). The aim was to get China's perspectives on global affairs heard and understood.26 CCTV set up a global, multi-platform network, CCTV International; while China Radio International (CRI), and Xinhua News Service also expanded their global presence. From 2007 the Hu government officially embraced Joseph Nye's theory of soft power, using it both as a justification and as a new euphemism, for the Chinese government's expanded and revised overseas Chinese and foreigner management techniques and propaganda offensive.27 ... Like Mao, Xi stresses the importance of information control. In the modernized information environment, this now means not only China’s public sphere, but also how the international media and international academia comments on China and China-related issues. Thus the revitalized CCTV International, re-branded in 2016 as CGTV (China Global Television), provides the CCP line to the outside world (emphasizing business, not politics) via 24-hour satellite broadcasts and social media. At the same time, China Radio International (CRI) and the Xinhua News Service have cornered niche foreign radio, television, and online platforms via mergers and partnership agreements. China Daily, the CCP’s English language newspaper, has arrangements to publish supplements in major newspapers around the world. China has also announced media cooperation partnerships with nations it calls “strategic partners” such as Russia, Turkey, and the 16-plus-1 (central and East European, plus China) states. Chinese universities and university presses have set up partnerships with their foreign counterparts and we are steadily seeing the creep of Chinese censorship into these domains as a result. ...
1. “Bring together the hearts and the power of the overseas Chinese” 35
Xi Jinping’s ambitious strategy to harness the overseas Chinese population for the CCP’s current economic and political agenda, builds on existing practices and then takes it to a new level of ambition....
Xi Jinping’s ambitious strategy to harness the overseas Chinese population for the CCP’s current economic and political agenda, builds on existing practices and then takes it to a new level of ambition....
2. Make the foreign serve China
In 2013, at the national conference on CCP Propaganda and Thought Work Xi
Jinping utilized a well-known saying of Mao Zedong “make the past serve the
present, make the foreign serve China” (古为今用, 洋为中用) to sum up his
administration’s back-to-the-future approach to governance.43 In foreign affairs, the
Xi administration has revived traditional CCP policies of utilizing people-to-people,
party-to-party, and now PRC enterprise-to-foreign enterprise relations in order to
coopt foreigners to support and promote China’s foreign policy goals.
3. “Make the CCP’s message the loudest of our times”47
The Xi government’s go-global, multi-platform, national and international strategic communication strategy aims to influence international perceptions about China, shape international debates about the Chinese government and strengthen management over the Chinese-language public sphere in China, as well as globally. ...
The Xi government’s go-global, multi-platform, national and international strategic communication strategy aims to influence international perceptions about China, shape international debates about the Chinese government and strengthen management over the Chinese-language public sphere in China, as well as globally. ...
4. One Belt, One Road
This is the Xi government’s initiative to create a China-centered economic bloc, one that is “beyond ideology” and will reshape the global order. 5354 One Belt, One Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), builds on, and greatly extends, the “going out” (走出去) policy launched in 1999 in the Jiang era and continued into the Hu era, which encouraged public-private partnerships between Chinese SOEs and Chinese Red Capitalists in China and overseas to acquire global natural resource assets and seek international infrastructure projects.55 ...
Yang Jian’s wife, who goes by the English name “Jane”116, was in the same graduate programme with him at the Luoyang PLA Foreign Language Institute at Luoyang, is part of the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters of the PLA, one of the PLA’s two military intelligence agencies. The Third Department is the equivalent of the USSR’s GRU or the USA’s National Security Agency. The Third Department is in charge of China’s signals intelligence operations and provides
This is the Xi government’s initiative to create a China-centered economic bloc, one that is “beyond ideology” and will reshape the global order. 5354 One Belt, One Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), builds on, and greatly extends, the “going out” (走出去) policy launched in 1999 in the Jiang era and continued into the Hu era, which encouraged public-private partnerships between Chinese SOEs and Chinese Red Capitalists in China and overseas to acquire global natural resource assets and seek international infrastructure projects.55 ...
Yang Jian’s wife, who goes by the English name “Jane”116, was in the same graduate programme with him at the Luoyang PLA Foreign Language Institute at Luoyang, is part of the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters of the PLA, one of the PLA’s two military intelligence agencies. The Third Department is the equivalent of the USSR’s GRU or the USA’s National Security Agency. The Third Department is in charge of China’s signals intelligence operations and provides
intelligence assessments.114
The PLA would not have allowed anyone with Yang Jian's military intelligence
background to go overseas to study—unless they had official permission. Even if he
had left the PLA, he would have had to wait at least two years before he would be
allowed to go abroad and he would have had to have official permission from his
former employer to obtain a Chinese passport. In 1994 Yang Jian moved to Australia
to study for his second Masters in International Relations and then a PhD at the
Australian National University. He quickly became heavily involved in united front
activities there. He was chairman of the Chinese Student and Scholars Association in
Canberra for many years; and after he moved to Auckland, he took on leadership
roles in overseas Chinese activities there too.119
Since he entered parliament Yang has been a central figure promoting and helping to shape the New Zealand National government’s China strategy and been responsible for their engagement with the New Zealand Chinese community. From 2014-2016 Yang Jian was a member of the Parliamentary Select Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Yang accompanied New Zealand PM John Key and his successor PM Bill English on trips to China and in meetings with senior Chinese leaders when they visited New Zealand. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magic_weapons.pdf
......................................................
The media organisations said
Yang Jian had not disclosed his work as a teacher at China's top linguistics academy for military intelligence officers. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41256914
Since he entered parliament Yang has been a central figure promoting and helping to shape the New Zealand National government’s China strategy and been responsible for their engagement with the New Zealand Chinese community. From 2014-2016 Yang Jian was a member of the Parliamentary Select Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Yang accompanied New Zealand PM John Key and his successor PM Bill English on trips to China and in meetings with senior Chinese leaders when they visited New Zealand. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magic_weapons.pdf
......................................................
The media organisations said
No comments:
Post a Comment